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THE LIMITS OF AUTONOMY: FORCE-FEEDINGS IN CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND IN PRISONS

The right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live. And then this
new right is established: the right to make live and to let die.1
For perhaps the first time in human history, the definition of death changed in
the 1970s with the advent of new medical technologies. At one time, death meant
the cessation of heartbeat, breathing, and brain function. But with the proliferation
of defibrillators and respirators in hospital wards, able to sustain heartbeat and
breathing indefinitely, brain function became the means by which death is now
defined, “with appropriate blurriness.”2
These medical advancements have created an area of compromised individual
autonomy. When persons become unconscious patients, their wishes are difficult to
determine and act upon. In the case of patients who lack capacity to voice their wishes
concerning medical treatment and decisionmaking, disagreement among family
members, or between a medical proxy and an institution, can lead to court battles.
In this article, I will discuss how society and law have grappled with these
definitions since the 1970s as they pertain to medical autonomy—that is, a person’s
right to be informed about all medical risks and options and to agree to or deny any
of them, even if the decision should result in the individual’s death. First, I will
discuss the history of autonomy as the concept has evolved in medical ethics and the
courts. Second, in order to illustrate how bodily autonomy is defined—to whom it
extends and to whom it does not, and in what settings—I examine one medical
treatment, the use of a feeding tube, and where it can be legally used despite a
competent individual’s refusal. I will discuss two places where a person can be fed
against his or her will: a Catholic hospital and a prison.3
Only since the 1970s has the concept of autonomy been enshrined in medical
ethics.4 Until that time, care decisions were mostly made by doctors unilaterally.5 But
a host of changes in medicine and society brought about greater demands for patient
autonomy.6 New medical technologies, social movements, and the exposure of medical
atrocities all produced a revolution in medical ethics that granted individuals the

1.

Michel Foucault, 17 March 1976, in “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the Collége
de France 1975–76, at 239, 241 (Mauro Bertani & Allessandro Fontana et al. eds, David Macey trans.,
Picador 2003).

2.

Sherwin B. Nuland, How We Die: Reflections on Life’s Final Chapter 42 (Vintage Books ed.
1995).

3.

See Ann Neumann, The Longest Hunger Strike, Guernica (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.guernicamag.
com/features/the-longest-hunger-strike/.

4.

See Jacob Appel, Rethinking Force-Feeding: Legal and Ethical Aspects of Physician Participation in the
Termination of Hunger Strikes in American Prisons, 26 Pub. Aff. Q. 313, 319 (2012).

5.

For a more complete discussion of the tradition of paternalism in medicine, see Jay Katz, The Silent
World of Doctor and Patient (2002). While the ongoing debate regarding paternalism has
criticized doctors’ decisionmaking on behalf of patients, recent critics charge that the debate has moved
too far toward patient autonomy and must be tempered by recognition of doctors’ beneficence.

6.

See Mellar P. Davis et al., Just Whose Autonomy Is It?, 19 J. Clinical Oncology 3787 (2001).
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ability to make medical decisions for themselves.7 Subsequent court cases established
“right-to-die” jurisprudence.8 Unfortunately, this legal and ethical acceptance of
autonomy is not universal in the United States.
The idea that a person should have autonomy in making medical decisions has
been around for over a century. Several sources cite the Union Pacific Railroad v.
Botsford decision in 1891 as perhaps one of the earliest legal acknowledgements of the
concept.9 The case was brought to determine whether the plaintiff, Clara L.
Botsford, who had been injured while occupying the upper berth in a train sleeping
car, could be forced to undergo a medical examination, without her consent, upon a
request made by the defendant railway company three days before trial. The court
determined that it could not require a medical examination without her consent,
citing “indelicacy.”10 The court stated, “No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of the law.”11 Despite Botsford, it
took another seventy years for this concept of personal autonomy in medical decisions
to gain traction, both in the courts and the medical community.12
Jacob Appel, an American author, bioethicist, and social critic, believes that the
development of new medical technologies in the 1960s and 1970s led to the
integration of the concept of autonomy into medical ethics.13 While these medical
advancements—coupled with cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), 9-1-1 lines, and
the population’s shift to urban living, where an ambulance team could readily reach
the stricken in their homes or on the street—saved countless lives, they also created
an area of ethics that was unexplored. Sometimes a patient’s heart and lungs could be
restarted, but if the victim was without oxygen for a sustained duration of time, the
amount of brain damage could be irreparable. In these cases, death often became a
decision: whether or not to pull the proverbial plug. Medical ethics—including the
adoption of informed consent and patient-autonomy guidelines—developed to meet
these areas of new and ill-defined practice. In addition to medical advancements,
social movements (such as those for civil rights and women’s rights), and media
7.

See id. For a discussion of the historical development of informed consent and the philosophical analysis
of patient autonomy, see Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of
Informed Consent (1986).

8.

See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997).

9.

See e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261; William H. Colby, Unplugged: Reclaiming Our Right to Die in
America 84 (2006); Mara Silver, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of SelfStarvation, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 631, 640 (2005).

10.

See generally Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).

11.

Id. at 251.

12.

See Appel, supra note 4, at 319.

13.

See id. I have also discussed this with Appel in person. Those technologies include respirators,
defibrillators, feeding tubes, and other medicines or treatments that are increasingly employed during
the last weeks and months of a terminal patient’s life.
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exposure of gross violations of patients’ rights (including forced sterilization14 and
infection programs15), spurred a public call for more informed consent from patients.
These public outcries challenged existing authorities, including the medical
profession, state governments, and religious institutions, regarding the rights of
individuals over their own bodies.16
Law and accepted medical ethics, however, are not always shaped and applied in
tandem; often laws can be developed only through additional court cases or are
limited by exceptions that render particular demographic groups outside their
application. Furthermore, the confounding nature of determining consent for
patients and prisoners who are—or later become—incompetent is particularly
challenging.17 This evolution means that today’s medical ethics are only legally
enforceable once corresponding laws are developed. Enforcement is often subject to
the ability of patients (including those from minority groups or with limited
resources) to identify such ethics and demand the compliance of medical practitioners,
whether individual doctors or institutions. When those patients are subject to
undesired treatment, their rights are left unrecognized and ignored.

14.

From 1909 until 1963, California sterilized 20,000 institutionalized young men and women. See
Elizabeth Cohen & John Bonifeld, California’s Dark Legacy of Forced Sterilizations, CNN (Mar. 15,
2002), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/15/health/california-forced-sterilizations/index.html. Texas,
Oklahoma, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and other states also had forced sterilization programs.
For a complete discussion of the history of forced sterilizations in the United States, see Mark A.
Largent, Breeding Contempt: The History of Forced Sterilization in the United States
(Rutgers Univ. Press 2011).

15.

One such long-term program, which caused public outrage, was the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment,
named for the Alabama institute where it took place. In 1972, several newspaper articles brought
attention to a long-term medical study, initiated in 1932 by the U.S. Public Health Service, that examined
the health of several hundred men infected with syphilis. Most of the study participants were poor black
sharecroppers. Although nearly four hundred men were already infected with syphilis, the Public Health
Service decided to not provide them with medical treatment. By the time the study was brought to light,
128 men had died. Additionally, it was revealed that the subjects had not been informed of their illness
or possible treatments for it. The incident forced Congress in 1974 to hold hearings on the study; the
scandal became a touchstone for patients’ rights advocates. See Henry T. Greely, Our System of Human
Subjects Protection: Its History and Current Functioning, in Medicine After the Holocaust: From the
Master Race to the Human Genome and Beyond 186, 187 (Sheldon Rubenfeld ed., 2010).

16.

In the wake of Tuskegee, laws enforcing informed consent for research subjects were enacted. See U.S.
Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee: How Tuskegee Changed Research Practices, Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm (last updated Sept. 24,
2013). For more on the development of informed consent, see Tom L. Beauchamp & James F.
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford Univ. Press 6th ed. 2008).

17.

In the past four decades, legal documents such as advanced directives and living wills have been
developed to determine patients’ medical desires. Medical or health care proxies, the legal designation
of a friend or family member as the person responsible for a patient’s decisions should they become
incapacitated, are now recognized and utilized in most states. While these documents can still be
contested in court—and routinely are—they represent a legal attempt to truly honor a patient’s right to
medical autonomy.
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Regarding the use of feeding tubes, two particular cases established that
individuals possess a right to refuse life-saving medical treatment:18 Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health19 and Washington v. Glucksberg.20 Yet today, prisoners
who are on hunger strike are routinely force-fed because courts have failed to apply
Cruzan and Glucksberg to prisoners.21 In addition, the Catholic Church has thwarted
patient autonomy when religious ideology is determined to be in conflict with patients’
medical decisions.22
After a car accident in 1983, Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state.23
Her parents agreed to place her on a feeding tube three weeks after her accident, but
four years later, they came to the conclusion that their daughter would not recover.24
The 1990 Cruzan decision by the U.S. Supreme Court established “the sanctity of
self-determination” and noted Botsford, stating that the “principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical

18.

See Silver, supra note 9, at 639. The term “life-saving” (or “life-sustaining” or “life-support”) is problematic
and misleading in cases when the patient is brain dead, in a persistent vegetative state, or unresponsive.
In these instances—for example, two recent cases involving a brain dead child in California and an
unresponsive pregnant woman in Texas—what is being supported or sustained is not the life of the
individual, but his or her biological functions by artificial means. See Elizabeth Landau, When “Life
Support” Is Really Death Support”, CNN (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/28/
health/life-support-ethics/index.html?sr=sharebar_twitter.

19.

See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (“The logical corollary of the doctrine
of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse
treatment.”).

20. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“We have also assumed, and strongly suggested,

that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment.”).
21.

Cruzan and Glucksberg suggest that a person has the autonomy to deny a feeding tube by holding that the
Due Process Clause may protect the right to refuse unwanted life-saving medical treatment. Although
recent media coverage of force-feeding prisoners at Guantánamo has perpetuated the idea that forcefeeding is an anamoly, it is well documented that hunger-striking prisoners are routinely force-fed
throughout the United States. See Christie Thompson, California Hunger Strike Raises Issue of ForceFeeding on U.S. Soil, ProPublica (July 12, 2013, 1:20 PM), http//www.propublica.org/article/californiahunger-strike-raises-issue-of-force-feeding-on-u.s.-soil (discussing the case of New York prisoner
William Coleman); see also NY Court Upholds Force-Feeding of Prison Inmate, Wall St. J. (Jan. 20, 2012,
3:02 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/AP0a70a6eb8943416d89121d9e1457fa8e.html; Force-Inmates,
Migalhas Int’l (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.migalhas.com/mostra_noticia.aspx?cod=148425; Lee
Davidson, House Approves Amended Inmate Force-Feeding Bill, Salt Lake Trib. (Feb. 27, 2012, 11:30
PM), http://m.sltrib.com/sltrib/mobile/53577874-90/inmate-allow-bill-feeding.html.csp.

22.

The question of whether medical and religious ethics are jointly formed is indeed an old one. Since Pope
John Paul II in 2004 changed the definition of “ordinary means” (first expressed by Pope Pius XII in
1957), bioethicists have debated the morality of feeding tube usage in some patients, thus reapplying
this old question to new medical technologies—particularly when regarding application of Catholic
ethics to a pluralistic society, i.e., hospital patients. See Nicole Van Groningen, “Church Autonomy” in
Medical Ethical Decision Making, Santa Clara Univ. ( July 2008), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/
practicing/focusareas/medical/anh.html.

23.

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.

24.

See Colby, supra note 9, at 89.
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treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”25 The Cruzans were able to have
their daughter’s feeding tube removed, however, only when they later provided the
court with “clear and convincing evidence” that Nancy would have wanted that.26 She
died twelve days after the tube was removed, on December 26, 1990.27
In the 1997 U.S. Supreme Court case Washington v. Glucksberg, doctors, patients,
and Compassion & Choices28 sought to establish that the Washington State
Constitution did not prevent “aid in dying”—that is, a doctor’s legal ability to
prescribe lethal medication to a terminally ill patient for the patient’s selfadministration. The Court ruled in the state’s favor, holding that “the asserted ‘right’
to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest,” 29 but
confirmed the central holding of Cruzan.30 The key Glucksberg passage reads:
The right assumed in Cruzan . . . was not simply deduced from abstract
concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule that forced
medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition of protecting the
decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely
consistent with this Nation’s history and constitutional traditions.31

Yet both Cruzan and Glucksberg drew the ire of the Catholic Church and deeply
informed the Church’s hospital policies, ultimately contributing to a disruption in
the universal application of patient autonomy regarding the use of feeding tubes. The
Catholic Church’s views on feeding tubes—or patient autonomy and health care
policy in general—are not small matters; the Church operates more than one-fifth of
all hospital beds in the United States (over six hundred hospitals), forty-five of which

25.

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.

26. Id. at 268–87.
27.

See Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27,
1990, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/27/us/nancy-cruzan-dies-outlived-by-adebate-over-the-right-to-die.html.

28. Compassion & Choices describes itself as the largest aid-in-dying advocacy group in the United States. See

Mary Steiner, Compassion Drives ‘Aid in Dying’ Movement, Compassion & Choices (June 2, 2013, 9:58
PM), http://www.compassionandchoices.org/2013/06/03/compassion-drives-aid-in-dying-movement/.
29. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). The U.S. Supreme Court failed to acknowledge

the plaintiff ’s assertion that patients who seek aid in dying are not suicidal, but instead terminally ill, and
therefore actively dying. Aid in dying is now legal in four states in the United States: Vermont, Oregon,
Washington, and Montana. Voters passed the Death with Dignity Act in Oregon in 1994. See Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800–897 (West 2013). Similar legislation was passed in Washington in 2008. See
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.245.010–904 (West 2013). The Montana Supreme Court found that the
state constitution did not prevent doctors from prescribing lethal medication to terminally ill patients in
2009. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009). In May 2013, the Vermont House and Senate
both passed the End of Life Choice bill, making it the first state to do so through the legislative process.
See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5292 (West 2013). The bill, very similar to those in Oregon and
Washington, allows competent, terminal patients to request a lethal dose of medication from their
physician that the patient may then self-administer to hasten death. See id. § 5283.
30. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724.
31.

Id. at 726.

310

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 58 | 2013/14

are the sole providers in their respective regions.32 These hospitals, to varying degrees
depending on the diligence of the local bishop and compliance of medical staff, are
operated according to seventy-two Ethical and Religious Directives (ERDs) that are
written by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and approved
by the Vatican.33 The ERDs are categorized as “laws” that all Catholics—from the
pope, to the hospital orderly, to the grandmother in the pews—are required to abide
by.34 There is a long tradition of dissent among Church leadership and laity; yet it is
not uncommon for the public, the media, and the Church itself to speak as though it
has only one voice representing all those whom identify as Catholic. When the
Church is unable to influence public practice, it often turns to the media and the law
to exert its ideology. For example, while 98% of all Catholic women use contraception
at some time in their lives, the Church maintains the position that its affiliates
(colleges, hospitals, charities, etc.) will not allow contracted insurance companies to
cover contraception for employees.35 In this and other cases, the Church’s influence
on health care policy is well documented.36
Since the decision of Roe v. Wade in 1972, Catholic health care has been a study of
tensions. While the Vatican and its U.S. contingent, the USCCB, have engaged in
various campaigns to enforce—by law or social influence—their own unique version
of medical ethics, the Catholic Health Association, which is pragmatically engaged
with the day-to-day provision of health care, has become less beholden to the
leadership’s current ideologies. For instance, the association has consistently given its
support to the Obama administration’s health care reform act, 37 specifically the
Health and Human Services’ final accommodation for religious organizations opposed
to contraception38 —despite the USCCB’s opposition to the limited scope of the

32.

See Becky Garrison, Playing Catholic Politics with U.S. Healthcare, The Guardian (London) (Dec. 31,
2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/dec/31/catholic-us-healthcareabortion; Catholic Health Care and Social Services, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, http://www.
usccb.org/about/media-relations/statistics/health-care-social-service.cfm (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).

33.

See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services (5th ed. 2009).

34. Id. at 12.
35.

See Guttmacher Statistics on Catholic Women’s Contraceptive Use, Guttmacher Inst. (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/02/15/index.html; Dan Mercia, Obama Proposal
Would Let Religious Groups Opt-Out of Contraception Mandate, CNN (Feb. 1, 2013, 7:48 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/01/31/politics/religion-contraceptive-insurance.

36. See Ann Neumann, The Conscience Clause: It’s Not Just About 770,000 Hospital Employees, The Revealer

(Feb. 9, 2012, 9:39 PM), http://therevealer.org/archives/10392.
37.

In my opinion, “reform” is a hyperbolic portrayal of what the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (also known as “Obamacare”) represents.

38. Exemption and Accommodations in Connection with Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45

C.F.R. § 147.131 (2013); see also Women’s Preventive Services Coverage and Non-Profit Religious
Organizations, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/
Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-02012013.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
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accommodation.39 As we have seen with abortion, however, the Church has found it
effective to focus on state-level access and not just federal legislation. While working
with “pro-life” organizations, the Church has been instrumental in the enactment of
limitations to a women’s ability to have an abortion across the country, including age
limits, waiting periods, parental consent requirements, closures of clinics, and the
regulation of anti-abortion drugs.40 Furthermore, the Church has been very effective
at pressuring medical practitioners at Catholic hospitals to comply with Church
doctrine, which fully opposes abortion and many non-abortifacient methods of
contraception.41 It has also promoted an environment of shame and persecution of
both abortion providers, seekers, and recipients, as well as for pro-choice legislators.42
Catholic hospitals have been able to ignore an individual’s right to make personal
medical treatment decisions through ethical and legal exemptions in the form of
39.

See Barbara Mann Wall, The Role of Catholic Nurses in Women’s Healthcare Policy Disputes: A Historical
Study, 61 Nursing Outlook 367, 371–72 (2013).

40. After the expansive Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) decision, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood

v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), created the “undue burden” standard for evaluating government measures
to limit women’s access to abortions, effectively curtailing women’s rights by eliminating the “fundamental
rights” language as laid out in Roe. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46. As a result, procedures such as age limits,
waiting periods, parental-consent requirements, closure of clinics, and the regulation of anti-abortion
drugs have been deemed constitutional and are now commonplace. See State Policies in Brief: An Overview
of Abortion Laws, Guttmacher Inst. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_
OAL.pdf (“[Twenty-six] states require a woman seeking an abortion to wait a specified period of
time . . . . [Thirty-nine] states require some type of parental involvement in a minor’s decision to have an
abortion.”). While the Catholic Church does not exercise any direct role in creating such laws, its
influence is felt in the legislative process. See Rishona Fleishman, The Battle Against Reproductive Rights:
The Impact of the Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic Arenas, 14 Emory
Int’l L. Rev. 277, 301–04 (2000) (“[W]hile the Church has no state sanctioned role in U.S. politics, it
does continue to influence legislation.”).
41.

See Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical, and Public Policy Implications of Refusal
Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 469, 484 (2006) (“[T]he growing power of the nation’s Catholic
hospitals and health care systems creates the largest threat to the availability of a full range of
reproductive health care services for women.”); Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47
Mercer L. Rev. 1087, 1109 (1996) (stating that the services most likely to be dropped when a hospital
becomes Catholic are those related to abortion and anti-contraception); Jennifer Templeton Schirmer,
Physician Assistant as Abortion Provider: Lessons from Vermont, New York, and Montana, 49 Hastings L.J.
253, 273 (1997) (stating that many Catholic hospitals prohibit their staffs from performing abortions
and anti-contraceptive procedures, as well as from discussing or dispensing birth control). For an
overview of the Catholic Church’s reasons for opposing contraception, see Fact Sheet: Contraceptive
Mandates, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/humanlife-and-dignity/contraception/fact-sheets/contraceptive-mandates.cfm (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).

42.

Bishops and other members of the Catholic Church have criticized Catholic legislators for their views
on abortion. See, e.g., James L. Heft, Religion and Politics: The Catholic Contribution, 32 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 29, 35–36 (2006) (discussing the threats from fellow Catholics and bishops of excommunication to
then-presidential candidate John Kerry and every Catholic who voted for him in 2004 for Kerry’s prochoice position on abortion); see also Ken Lovett, Catholic League: Abortion Plan Will Cost Andrew Cuomo
Shot at Presidency, N.Y. Daily News (June 4, 2013, 6:23 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/
dailypolitics/2013/06/catholic-league-abortion-plan-will-cost-andrew-cuomo-shot-at-presidency-0
(explaining how New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s support for abortion rights would cost him a
chance at the presidency and quoting Catholic League President Bill Donohue’s statement that Cuomo’s
pro-choice stance is “political suicide”).
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various religious “conscience clauses.”43 Catholic hospitals receive 50% of their
funding from state and federal sources (in the form of Medicare and Medicaid
funding, less than 3% of funding is from Catholic sources), and, like “secular”
hospitals, they serve a pluralistic populace.44 Despite this fact, Catholic hospitals and
other religious entities have been protected from complying with standard medical
ethics and practices by a web of conscience clauses that began with the Church
Amendment in 1973, enacted in the wake of Roe v. Wade.45
Indeed, conflict with the Church over the “conscience clause” regarding the
provision of contraception in President Obama’s health care law has proven most
telling.46 In essence, the accommodation and existence of such “conscience clauses,”
when coupled with patients in traumatic situations who are left to make decisions
without full disclosure of services or meaningful referrals, allow Catholic hospitals to
be places where the medical choices of the institution—as dictated to administrators,
doctors, nurses, and patients alike by the Vatican-approved ERDs—supersede the
choices of the patients they serve. As many have asked, “whose conscience” are the
laws seeking to protect?47 In practice, these clauses do not protect the religious
freedom of patients, but instead protect the institution’s chosen ideological stance.

43.

See Martha S. Swartz, Conscience Clauses or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal Beliefs Versus Professional
Responsibilities, 6 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 269 (2006).

44. See Catholics for a Free Choice, Catholic Health Care Update: The Facts About Catholic

Health Care in the United States 2 (2005), available at http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/
healthcare/documents/2005factsaboutcatholichealthcare.pdf.
45.

See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2011); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 238n, 1395w-22(j)(3)(B), 1396u-2; 48 C.F.R. §
1609.7001(c)(7) (2012); Jody Feder, Cong. Res. Serv., The History and Effect of Abortion
Conscience Clause Laws 1–2 (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/
crsdocuments/RS2142801142005.pdf.

46. See 42 U.S.C. § 18023 (2011) (stating that, under federal law, a health insurance plan or health care

provider does not need to cover or provide abortion services if it is contrary to its religious or moral
beliefs); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (exempting religious organizations from having to provide contraception
coverage in the health insurance plans they offer to their employees, but requiring health insurance
providers to offer separate contraception coverage to such employees at no additional cost); see also
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139
(U.S. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-354) (holding that requiring Hobby Lobby to comply with 45 C.F.R. §
147.131 would violate its religious beliefs); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139 (U.S. Nov. 26,
2013) (No. 13-356) (holding that “for-profit, secular corporations cannot engage in religious exercise,”
and therefore the contraception mandate under 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 does not violate plaintiff ’s religious
freedom); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013) (agreeing with the Third Circuit’s
holding in Conestoga Wood); Zubik v. Sebelius, No. 13-1459 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2013) (order granting
preliminary injunction against enforcement of 45 C.F.R. § 147.131).
47.

Sandhya Bathija, Whose Conscience Counts?, Americans United (Oct. 2009), https://www.au.org/
church-state/october-2009-church-state/featured/whose-conscience-counts; E. Christian Brugger,
Whose Conscience? Whose Religion? The Enemy Is Partially Us, Zenit (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.zenit.
org/en/articles/whose-conscience-which-religion-the-enemy-is-partially-us; Linda Greenhouse, Whose
Conscience?, N.Y. Times Opinionator (Feb. 8, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/02/08/whose-conscience/.
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In 1976, Karen Ann Quinlan was the first person to be the subject of a national
debate about the removal of life support. Twelve years later the Cruzan case came to
the courts, and ten years after that came the case of Terri Schiavo.48 Schiavo was a
Florida woman whose parents unsuccessfully recruited Republican Senators and the
President to commandeer medical guardianship in 2005, against the rulings of a
district court49 and the wishes of Schiavo’s husband.50 The Quinlan, Cruzan, and
Schiavo court cases represent the Catholic Church’s holy trinity of young, white,
childless women 51 removed from feeding tubes or, as “pro-life” activists have
characterized it, “killed” by a “culture of death” that failed to see the women as
vulnerable or disabled.52 Cruzan prepared the Church for Schiavo, which was
publicized by a coalition of Church leaders, associated activists, and politicians in an
unprecedented way.53
These cases, particularly Schiavo’s, caused the Church to change the ERDs to
shift the decision to remove a feeding tube from a patient or the patient’s family to
the hospital administration when the patient’s wish is “contrary to Catholic moral
teaching.”54 ERD 58 specifically states:
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and water,
including medically assisted nutrition and hydration for those who cannot
take food orally. This obligation extends to patients in chronic and presumably
irreversible conditions (e.g., the “persistent vegetative state”) who can
reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care.55

Because Catholic hospitals are protected by the conscience clauses that allow them to
deviate from general medical ethics, and because vulnerable patients and their
families often do not know what their options are and look to attending doctors for
direction, patients are effectively denied an established legal right that would, outside
48. See Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Abby Goodnough, Supreme Court

Refuses to Hear the Schiavo Case, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/03/25/politics/25schiavo.html.
49. See id.
50. See Ann Neumann, The Resurrection of Terri Schiavo, Religion Dispatches (Aug. 10, 2009), http://

www.religiondispatches.org/archive/politics/1747/the_resurrection_of_terri_schiavo/.
51.

I submit that it is no coincidence that the three most prominent right-to-die cases were about young,
white women. The race, age, and gender of these three individuals are significant in that they contributed
to a particular media interest and attracted the paternal, protective instincts of the Catholic Church.
Furthermore, because the Church has successfully focused its attention on female bodies of reproductive
age (regarding abortion and contraception), these three women codified the Church’s “pro-life” platform
as inclusive of reproductive rights and end-of-life rights.

52.

See Bobby Schindler, Terri Schiavo, Her Death Marked a Beginning, WND.com (Mar. 31 2013, 1:56
PM), http://www.wnd.com/2013/03/terri-schiavo-her-death-marked-a-beginning/.

53.

See PBS Newshour: The Schiavo Case Receives Strong Media Coverage (PBS radio broadcast Mar. 24,
2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june05/schiavo_3-24.html; William H.
Colby, From Quinlan to Cruzan to Schiavo: What Have We Learned?, 37 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 279 (2006).

54. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 33, at 31.
55.

Id.
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a Catholic institution, be recognized.56 In other words, patients in Catholic hospitals
have fewer autonomy rights than those in non-Catholic hospitals.
The comparison of feeding tube usage in Catholic hospitals and prisons is at first
surprising given the divergent nature of public regard for each institution. Hospitals
are for healing and Catholic hospitals are held in deserved high regard in the public
consciousness. Prisons, in contrast, are for the punishment and reform of criminals;
they are expected to exercise justice and discipline, at a cost to the prisoner, but also,
arguably, for the benefit of the prisoner and society in general. Yet much can be
learned from the comparison. The Catholic hospital is not the only place where
patients’ rights are, in theory and practice, second to those of the managing
organization; prisoners are routinely denied the right to refuse a feeding tube. To stay
on a hunger strike long enough for prison officials to contemplate force-feeding is
not easy; a hunger strike requires physical strength and emotional conviction. But
the force-feeding of striking prisoners is not rare, although it is rarely publicized.57
William Coleman, a hunger-striking prisoner in Connecticut, has been routinely
force-fed since 2008.58 Coleman began his hunger strike on September 17, 2007, two
weeks after he was incarcerated, to protest his conviction. He says that he is innocent.
He asserts that his hunger strike is the only remaining way he can exercise his First
Amendment rights. He also asserts that being force-fed is a violation of his right to
deny medical treatment and characterizes it as torture. Since he first stopped eating,
he has not consumed solid food, although he has intermittently taken fluids like
milk, juice, and Ensure. He has lost more than 106 pounds, four teeth, and has
suffered untold damage to his internal organs from malnutrition. Just over one year
after he started his hunger strike, the medical staff sought and received a temporary
injunction to force-feed Coleman with a tube.59

56. I have spoken about this in various locations and contexts, and invariably am told that a patient who

wishes to have a tube removed—or not inserted in the first place—should simply go to another, nonCatholic hospital. Yet, as we have seen with abortion, legal rights are often stifled by lack of information
and access. Abortion is legal in the United States, yet four states have only one provider. See Tracy
Connor, 40 Years After Roe v. Wade, More States Restricting Abortion, NBCNews.com (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/21/16624980-40-years-after-roe-v-wade-more-statesrestricting-abortion?lite. Other restrictions on age, waiting periods, and procedural requirements have
been rampantly enacted in recent years. See Michael Keller & Allison Yarrow, The Geography of Abortion
Access, The Daily Beast (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/22/thegeography-of-abortion-access.html. The fact that abortion is legal in the United States does not
guarantee access to those in Catholic institutions. Incapacitated patients are challenged when they need
to move to another hospital, just as patients seldom have a choice of which hospital they use, or
knowledge of what the choice of hospital could mean.
57.

See Appel, supra note 4, at 316–20.

58. In January 2012, David McGuire, Coleman’s lawyer at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of

Connecticut, provided me with Coleman’s mailing address in prison. Since then, Coleman and I have
regularly corresponded via letters and over the telephone.
59.

See Comm’r of Corr. v. Coleman, 38 A.3d 84, 89–90 (Conn. 2012).
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Coleman and the ACLU sued the State of Connecticut and the Commissioner of
the Department of Corrections to stop the feedings.60 Coleman wanted to be kept
comfortable, according to his living will, and to be allowed to die. The court explained
that it “must determine whether the commissioner’s interests outweigh the incarcerated
defendant’s common law right to refuse nutrition and liquids without interference.”61
It ruled that in the interest of preventing “copycat hunger strikes and the duty to
preserve Coleman’s life, even against his wishes, the feedings were ‘justified.’”62
In other similar cases, courts often cite two reasons for force-feeding prisoners:
prevention of suicide and maintenance of prison order.63 “Curiously absent from any
state arguments or judicial opinions are the more philosophical notions that a prisoner
should be forced to live out his sentence as a form of retribution for his crimes.”64
Instead, courts most often note the state’s interest in the prisoner’s health and wellbeing and that of the other prisoners and staff. There is scant evidence that
hunger-strikers disrupt prisons. Prison wardens who seek permission to force-feed
prisoners routinely receive it without any proof of disruption.65 Indeed, the 2013 case
60. See ACLU of Connecticut Legal Docket, ACLU of Conn., https://www.acluct.org/wp-content/uploads/

2013/08/UPDATEDLegalDocket.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
61.

Coleman, 38 A.3d at 94.

62. Appel, supra note 4, at 313. Despite the categorization of force-feeding as torture by the world’s major

medical associations, the force-feeding of prisoners continues in the United States, most recently at
Guantánmo prison. See also World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Tokyo—Guidelines for Physicians
Concerning Torture (1975), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c18/
(stating that a prisoner capable of rational judgment shall not be fed artificially); Carol Rosenberg, AMA
Opposes Forced Feedings at Guantánamo, Miami Herald (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.
com/2013/04/30/3372407/guantanamo-hunger-strike-holds.html (discussing a letter from Jeremy
Lazarus, AMA President, to Charles T. Hagel, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, stating that force-feeding detainees
violates AMA ethical values); Red Cross Chief Blasts U.S. for Force-Feeding Gitmo Inmates, RT (May 15,
2013, 1:53 PM), http://rt.com/usa/red-cross-guantanamo-maurer-770 (discussing statements made by
Peter Mauer, President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross); Hunger Games: Critical Health Fears as Gitmo
Strike Marks Day 100, RT (May 16, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://rt.com/usa/red-cross-guantanamomaurer-770 (discussing the force-feeding of prisoners which continues in the United States at Guantánamo
prison). For more details on Guantánamo, see The Constitution Project, the Report of the
Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment (2013).
63. For other examples of cases where prisoners’ health and prison order are cited, see Bezio v. Dorsey, 937

N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dep’t 2012) (holding that a state may take affirmative action to prevent the suicide of
a prisoner in the event of a hunger strike to preserve the state’s interest in protecting the health of
inmates); Stevenson v. Lanham, 736 A.2d 363 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Doe v. United States, 150
F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing a prison’s responsibility to provide care to preserve life, prevent
suicide, and maintain prison order); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984) (discussing the potentially
negative implications of hunger strikes on prison order and the state’s need to force-feed prisoners in
order to promote the interests in preserving human life and preventing suicide).
64. Silver, supra note 9, at 643.
65.

Only three states have laws against force-feeding prisoners: Florida, Georgia, and California (although
a judge in California ruled that prisoners on hunger strike there in 2013 could be force-fed if they did
not have a do-not-resuscitate order in writing). See David Ingram & Jane Sutton, Analysis: In ForceFeeding Detainees, Obama Has Courts on His Side, Reuters (Apr. 26, 2013, 7:53 AM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/04/26/us-usa-guantanamo-forced-feeding-idUSBRE93P04N20130426.
Other recent prisoner force-feedings have taken place in Washington, Utah, Illinois, Wisconsin, and
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in Guantánamo—where a hundred or more of the 166 prisoners there were on
hunger strike and dozens were force-fed—may show that force-feedings contribute
to the spread of hunger strikes.
In contravention of Cruzan and Glucksberg, but in clear keeping with other cases
throughout the country, the justices in Coleman’s case “reject[ed] the defendant’s
argument that starving himself to death is not suicide because it yields the same
result as suicide: self-inflicted death.”66 Because Coleman will only stop his hunger
strike if his conviction is overturned, and he has no further chance to appeal, the
court reasoned that Coleman could not justify continuing his hunger strike, and
concluded that he must be suicidal.67
Although Coleman has completed his initial sentence, he continues to be held
because he refuses to sign the sexual offender list, a “choice” that has garnered him
five more years of incarceration. Regardless, he does not want to leave prison unless
his sentence of guilt is reconsidered. Coleman continues his hunger strike even
though the medical staff has interpreted the court decision on force-feeding in
various ways. Feeding orders seldom designate how or when a prisoner should be fed,
although they do stipulate that force can be used. Coleman has gone through periods
of relative physical stability because of regular feedings—sometimes facilitated by a
semi-permanent tube placed in his right nostril—and periods of physical and mental
decline without feedings. Coleman’s hunger strike is the longest in the United States
that I can find record of.
In both the cases of William Coleman and Nancy Cruzan, the patient, or his or
her proxy, decided that death—by denial or removal of a feeding tube—was preferable
to living in his or her current state. Only after years in court was Cruzan’s tube
removed,68 which portends that, while force-fed prisoners are still considered to be
New York. See Ann Neumann, Guantánamo Is Not an Anomaly—Prisoners Are Force-Fed in the U.S.
Every Day, Waging Nonviolence (May 4, 2013), http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/guantanamois-not-an-anomaly-prisoners-in-the-us-are-force-fed-every-day/. For court cases, see McNabb v. Dep’t
of Corr., 180 P.3d 1257 (Wash. 2008); White v. Suneja, No. 10-cv-332-JPG, 2010 WL 4719663, at *2
(S.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2010); Bruce Vielmetti, Judge Extends Involuntary Treatment Order for Wold, Journal
Sentinel (Milwaukee) (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/crime/judge-closes-hearingto-public-in-murderforhire-case-q838ui6-134779723.html (discussing the case of Darren Wold); In re
Lilly, 804 N.W.2d 489 (Wis. 2011); Bezio, 937 N.Y.S.2d 393; Stevenson, 736 A.2d 363. In 2012, Utah
passed a law in response to the death of hunger-striking prisoner Carlos Umana. See Involuntary
Feeding and Hydration of Inmates, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16b-101–105 (West 2013); see also Robert
Gehrke, Utah Inmate’s Starvation Death Spurs Bill on Force-Feeding, Salt Lake Trib. (Feb. 10, 2012,
10:54 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/53484550-90/inmate-bill-hunger-brown.html.csp.
66. Comm’r of Corr. v. Coleman, 38 A.3d 84, 90 (Conn. 2012).
67.

See id. at 100–01.

68. See Nancy Cruzan’s Legacy the Public Is Wiser About the ‘Right to Die’, Phila. Inquirer (Dec. 27, 1990),

http://articles.philly.com/1990-12-27/news/25923204_1_nancy-cruzan-cruzan-case-budget-bill.
Although not explicitly, Cruzan established that feeding tube removal at “secular” hospitals is at the
discretion of patients and their proxies. Yet conscience clauses and the policies of the Catholic Church
regarding tube removal have infused the decisionmaking process with confusion, misinformation, and
coercion in Catholic hospitals. See David F. Kelly, Gerard Magill & Henk ten Have,
Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics (2d ed. 2013); Scott Hensley, Obama Pushes
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without full medical autonomy, perhaps the courts will continue to pressure Catholic
institutions to comply with standard medical ethics—at least where feeding tube
usage is concerned.
The issue of patient autonomy is not just about the patient; it is about doctors as
well. Those employed by institutions that insist on force-feeding prisoners or patients
are unable to comply with standard medical ethics and because of coercion, the need
for job security, isolation from the medical community, or other forces, they are
prevented from exercising their own conscience regarding the practice. Stateemployed prison clinicians must “act in contravention of growing medical consensus
that such conduct is an ethical violation.”69 At least one commentator has suggested
that “regulation of professional licensure” may be the “most direct, albeit politically
challenging, mechanism for halting physician participation.” 70
Culture and law, though, continue to be the driving forces that shape society’s
position regarding medical autonomy. Perhaps the most compelling argument for
re-examining the use of feeding tubes is this identification, comparison, and analysis
of two sites in the United States where a person’s decision to discontinue lifesustaining71 treatment will not be followed. Such inquiry begs the question of why
the constitutional right to autonomy in medical treatment decisions arguably stops at
the Church door or the prison wall.

Hospitals to Honor Patients’ Choices, Compassion & Choices (Apr. 16, 2010, 3:59 PM), http://www.
compassionandchoices.org/2010/04/16/obama-pushes-hospitals-to-honor-patients-choices/.
69. Appel, supra note 4, at 326.
70. Id.
71.

See supra text accompanying note 18.
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